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1STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Teresa Tollman contends the district court erred when it denied her request for a
restricted driver’s license.  Specifically, the district court failed to appreciate the fact that
it had authority to grant her request under the amended version of I.C. § 18-8005(6)(d),
which it had because Ms. Tollman filed her request for restricted driving privileges after
the effective date for that amendment.
The State believes that granting Ms. Tollman’s request under the amended
version of the statute would be an improper retroactive application of the law.  That
argument represents a fundamental misunderstanding of the legal concept of
retroactivity.  The Idaho Supreme Court has consistently held that, in cases where the
request for relief is filed after the relevant amendment went into effect, retroactivity is
not an issue.  Rather, in those circumstances, the new law applies in a prospective
manner, even if the analysis relies on facts antecedent to the enactment of the
amendment.  Therefore, the State’s argument, which is directly contrary to that well-
established precedent, should be rejected.
As such, this Court should reverse the order denying Ms. Tollman’s application
for a restricted license and remand this case for further proceedings.
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated
in Ms. Tollman’s Appellant’s Brief.  They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but
are incorporated herein by reference thereto.
2ISSUE
Whether the district court had discretion to grant Ms. Tollman’s application for a
restricted driver’s license.
3ARGUMENT
The District Court Had Discretion To Grant Ms. Tollman’s Application For A Restricted
Driver’s License
The State contends the application of the 2015 amendment to I.C. § 18-
8005(6)(d) in Ms. Tollman’s case should be analyzed under the rules for retroactivity.
(Resp. Br., pp.4-6.)  That argument “‘is based on a misunderstanding of ‘retroactive’ as
a legal concept.’” See Univ. of Utah Hosp. on behalf of Harris v. Pence, 104 Idaho 172,
175 (1982) (quoting Holt v. Morgan, 274 P.2d 915, 917 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1954)
(making that same criticism of a similar argument in a similar case, where the cause of
action arose after the effective date of the statute at issue)).  However, “a law is
retroactive only when it operates upon transactions which have been completed or upon
rights which have been acquired or upon obligations which have existed prior to its
passage.” Frisbie v. Sunshine Mining Co., 93 Idaho 169, 172 (1969).  Here, just as in
Holt, Frisbie, and Univ. of Utah Hosp., the request for relief was made after the
amendment took effect.  As a result, this case is not in the realm of retroactivity at all.
The Idaho Supreme Court reaffirmed this point in Bryant v. City of Blackfoot, 137
Idaho 307, 313 (2002).  In Bryant, the relevant statute was amended after the injury
occurred, but before the plaintiff filed her claim. Id.  The Supreme Court held that the
plaintiff was required to adhere to the procedural requirement established in the
statutory amendment. Id.  It explained that such an application of the new version of the
statute “is actually prospective in nature” since it relates to the analysis which is to occur
in future cases, as opposed to revisiting decisions which have already been made. Id.
The Supreme Court reiterated this principle again in Stuart v. State:  “Because I.C. § 19-
2719 applies to post-conviction relief actions rather than the underlying criminal actions,
4its application is prospective—operating on all post-conviction petitions submitted after
the effective date of the statute.” Stuart v. State, 149 Idaho 35, 43 (2010).
In Ms. Tollman’s case, the 2015 amendment went into effect on July 1, 2015.
See 2015 Idaho Sess. Laws Ch. 60.  Ms. Tollman filed her initial request for restricted
privileges on March 16, 2016, and filed her renewed request on September 12, 2016.
(R., pp.10, 21, 24-25.)  Thus, the transaction at issue was not completed at the time the
2015 amendment went into effect. Compare Frisbie, 93 Idaho at 172; State v. Hiatt,
___ P.3d ___, 2017 WL 1459063, **1-2 (Ct. App. 2017) (holding that, when the district
court had already ruled on a motion for credit for time served and the law changed three
years after that decision was made, the defendant could not go back and alter that
decision based on a subsequent change in the law because that would constitute
improper retroactive application of the change in the law), not yet final.   Rather,  the
transaction had not yet begun. Compare Stuart, 149 Idaho at 43; Bryant, 137 Idaho at
313.  Therefore, applying the 2015 amendment to that request does not invoke any
concerns about retroactivity.
Thus, the State’s argument for this Court to apply the retroactivity rules in this
case should be rejected because that argument is completely contrary to the well-
established understanding of how the legal concept of retroactivity works. Stuart, 149
Idaho at 43; Bryant, 137 Idaho at 313; Esquivel v. State, 128 Idaho 390, 392 (1996)
(holding that application of a statute of limitations to a claim filed after the relevant
statute was enacted “is not retroactive” application of that new limitation); Univ. of Utah
Hosp., 104 Idaho at 174 (“a statute is not made retroactive merely because it draws
upon facts existing prior to its enactment.”); Stoner v. Carr, 97 Idaho 641, 643 (1976)
5(“the plaintiff’s cause of action did not accrue until discovery; thus, the 1971 amendment
was effective two years and four months prior to the accrual of the right of action and
application of the 1971 amendment to a cause of action accruing in 1973 does not
involve a retroactive application of law.”); Frisbie, 93 Idaho at 172 (“application of the
law in effect at the time the disability occurred to a claim arising from that disability does
not involve a retroactive application of the law”); Mellinger v. State, 113 Idaho 31, 33
(Ct. App. 1987) (“this case is not decided by the retroactive application of § 19-4902, but
rather by the prospective application of that statute.”) (emphasis from original).
Since the 2015 amendment to I.C. § 18-8005(6)(d) operates prospectively in
regard to Ms. Tollman’s subsequently-filed request for restricted driving privileges, the
district court erred when it refused to apply the law as it existed at the time she made
her request.  This is particularly troubling since the district court stated it would have
granted Ms. Tollman’s request for restricted privileges under the amended version of
the statute.  (Tr., p.11, Ls.2-4.)
CONCLUSION
Ms. Tollman respectfully requests this Court reverse the order denying her
application for a restricted driver’s license and remand this case for further proceedings.
DATED this 9th day of May, 2017.
__________/s/_______________
BRIAN R. DICKSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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